7/1/2026, 11:45:02 AM
Decision summary
Document merchant and rider controls that avoid exposing customers or riders.
Verify payments independently
Do not release goods or funds until you confirm inside your bank app.
Escalate suspicious requests
Use the official support channel instead of replying to the scam chat.
Report identifiers
Send handles, phone numbers, and payment links so TrustOps can corroborate.
Playbook sections
The scammer creates confusion between merchant, rider, and receiver, then extracts goods or money during a last-minute route change.
The pressure point is the moving rider. Fraudsters exploit weak address verification and real-time refund decisions.
Freeze address changes after dispatch unless the merchant confirms through a known channel. Riders should call dispatch before paying any fee.
Do not approve new addresses, refunds, or gate payments only through chat pressure.
Document merchant and rider controls that avoid exposing customers or riders.
Forum status
This public thread is a moderated briefing surface. Fresh evidence and supporting notes go through reviewed submission routes before TrustOps updates the public thread. Use reports for incident evidence, Ask TrustOps for questions, and fraud cards for card-specific deliberation.
Have more intelligence to add? Return to the forum index or review community rules.
